Cap'n Ed has reviewed the state of our dilemma in Pakistan. He's come up with an analysis that closely mirrors mine from a couple of days ago.
That's not actually much of a surprise. The dilemmas we face there are pretty obvious.
Monday, February 26, 2007
Wednesday, February 21, 2007
Discouraging Words
I got no response (of any kind) from my Senator regarding my questions on recommendation one. Yes, I know that was two months ago. My motivation factor was close to zero...for other reasons.
(As much as it seems so, the preceding is NOT a segue into the following)
I was speaking with my brother a couple of days ago and I mentioned an email I had sent to my representative through his web page, since that seemed to be the only way to do that (I didn't try real hard to scope out his actual email address; I suspect it was reasonably well hidden to prevent spam). He told me that it was his understanding that (I paraphrase here) that in the hierarchy of communications with government representatives, hand written letters come first, printed letters (like, typed from a printer) a distant second, and email falls into the form letter/spam category.
So my last post was not sent to my Senator.
(As much as it seems so, the preceding is NOT a segue into the following)
I was speaking with my brother a couple of days ago and I mentioned an email I had sent to my representative through his web page, since that seemed to be the only way to do that (I didn't try real hard to scope out his actual email address; I suspect it was reasonably well hidden to prevent spam). He told me that it was his understanding that (I paraphrase here) that in the hierarchy of communications with government representatives, hand written letters come first, printed letters (like, typed from a printer) a distant second, and email falls into the form letter/spam category.
So my last post was not sent to my Senator.
Monday, February 19, 2007
Recommendation 2 : Pakistan
Recommendation: If Musharraf stands for enlightened moderation in a fight for his life and for the life of his country, the United States should be willing to make hard choices too, and make the difficult long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan. Sustaining the current scale of aid to Pakistan, the United States should support Pakistan's government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education, so long as Pakistan's leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their own.
Notice the qualifications in this recommendation. It starts with one big if and ends with a "so long as". One of the underlying assumptions of the argument being made here is that having Pakistan on our side in this struggle is a good thing. It's a hard assumption to fault. If Pakistan were on our side, then we could count on the safe haven for Al Qaeda and the Taliban to be taken away, if not completely, then at least partially. If I remember correctly, one of the reasons for the success of the British against the Greek insurgency following WWII was the decision (by Tito?) to deny Yugoslavia as a refuge.
The discussion then raises the efforts made by Musharraf to aid us in this fight, all welcome additions to the struggle. It concludes its discussion with a reminder that Pakistan thinks that we "treat them as allies of convenience".
As we consider the changes in Pakistan over the last year or so, the treaty with the Taliban in Waziristan, some questions arise:
One of the most obvious flaws in the 9/11 Commission's recommendations regarding its three examples (here, Pakistan, next Afghanistan, last Saudi Arabia) is that they make the case for what we should do if these countries act, and continue to act, as our allies. The hard choice of what to do if they don't continue to do so is never laid out.
In the case of Pakistan, their possession of nuclear weapons means that we cannot ignore them. Their continued (lessening?) strife with India over Kashmir also creates a potential flashpoint that we cannot ignore. And we can't ignore the internal politics (read: divisions). As I intimated above, Musharraf may not be able to have a treaty with India AND a war with the Taliban. Musharraf may well be our last, best hope for a non-Islamic state. Surely the State Department is under no illusions that he is universally acclaimed and must be considering the future of a Pakistan without him and may well be considering that half a loaf is better than none. So we may be forced into what should probably be a well understood position of trying to muddle through another problem for which there is no good solution.
Notice the qualifications in this recommendation. It starts with one big if and ends with a "so long as". One of the underlying assumptions of the argument being made here is that having Pakistan on our side in this struggle is a good thing. It's a hard assumption to fault. If Pakistan were on our side, then we could count on the safe haven for Al Qaeda and the Taliban to be taken away, if not completely, then at least partially. If I remember correctly, one of the reasons for the success of the British against the Greek insurgency following WWII was the decision (by Tito?) to deny Yugoslavia as a refuge.
The discussion then raises the efforts made by Musharraf to aid us in this fight, all welcome additions to the struggle. It concludes its discussion with a reminder that Pakistan thinks that we "treat them as allies of convenience".
As we consider the changes in Pakistan over the last year or so, the treaty with the Taliban in Waziristan, some questions arise:
- Has Pakistan decided that we're no longer serious about the GWOT and decided to do what they can to maintain their country's peace as best they can?
- Has Pakistan tired of being an "ally of convenience" and decided to make their own accommodation with the enemy?
- Is Musharraf giving a pass to the Taliban so that he can negotiate with India?
One of the most obvious flaws in the 9/11 Commission's recommendations regarding its three examples (here, Pakistan, next Afghanistan, last Saudi Arabia) is that they make the case for what we should do if these countries act, and continue to act, as our allies. The hard choice of what to do if they don't continue to do so is never laid out.
In the case of Pakistan, their possession of nuclear weapons means that we cannot ignore them. Their continued (lessening?) strife with India over Kashmir also creates a potential flashpoint that we cannot ignore. And we can't ignore the internal politics (read: divisions). As I intimated above, Musharraf may not be able to have a treaty with India AND a war with the Taliban. Musharraf may well be our last, best hope for a non-Islamic state. Surely the State Department is under no illusions that he is universally acclaimed and must be considering the future of a Pakistan without him and may well be considering that half a loaf is better than none. So we may be forced into what should probably be a well understood position of trying to muddle through another problem for which there is no good solution.
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